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ESSAYS
Protection in the United States for
“Famous Marks”: The Federal
Trademark Dilution Act Revisited
Edward E. Vassallo*
Maryanne Dickey**
INTRODUCTION
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act,1 known as the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“Dilution Act” or “Act”), became effective January 16, 1996.2 The passage of the Act arguably
represents a high-water mark in the federal recognition of trademark
rights.3 The Act creates a genuine property right in trademarks
separate from any consumer confusion or deception.4 The standards
used to fully analyze a federal dilution claim are just beginning to
emerge in court decisions.
To understand trademark dilution, one must first examine
trademarks and trademark infringement. A trademark is any word,
name, symbol, or device employed by a manufacturer or a merchant
to identify his or her goods and to distinguish them from those of

* Member, Fitzpatrick Cella Harper & Scinto. Columbia University, B.S. 1965,
M.S. 1967; Fordham University School of Law, J.D. 1973.
** Associate, Fitzpatrick Cella Harper & Scinto. Boston University, B.A. 1983;
Fordham University School of Law, J.D. 1988. This Essay is dedicated to the memory of
Ms. Dickey.
1. Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999)) [hereinafter Lanham Act].
2. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat.
985 (effective Jan. 16, 1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 1998)).
3. See Eric A. Prager, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial
Likelihood of Confusion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 121, 121 (1996).
4. See id.
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another.5 “Trademark infringement occurs when one party adopts a
trademark which is the same as or is so similar to an existing mark
that, when it is applied to the second party’s goods, the relevant purchasing public is likely to be confused, mistaken, or deceived as between the goods themselves.”6 Dilution, by contrast, is the diminished capacity of a distinctive trademark to identify the source of
goods bearing that mark.7
There are five distinct areas that have received the most judicial attention in the area of trademark dilution: (1) the attempted
retroactive application of the statute; (2) the evidence used to determine whether or not a mark is famous; (3) the factors considered
to determine dilution by blurring; (4) what use of a mark is exempt
from the Act; (5) the “commercial use in commerce;”8 and (6) the
procedural matters to consider when pursuing, or defending
against, a federal dilution claim. Conceptually, a defendant’s use
of a mark can lead to trademark infringement without dilution, it
can lead to dilution without infringement, or it can result in infringement and dilution. Trademark infringement without dilution
occurs when a non-famous trademark is infringed.9 Trademark dilution without infringement occurs when plaintiff’s mark is distinctive and famous but the defendant’s conduct does not result in a
likelihood of confusion.10 Finally, trademark dilution and infringement occur when a distinctive and famous mark is infringed.11
In those cases where there is dilution but not infringement only
one of the two fundamental precepts of trademark infringement
law is present. Trademark infringement is a tort because two
5. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1998); see also Steven M. Cordero, Note, Cocaine-Cola, the Velvet Elvis, and Anti-Barbie: Defending the Trademark and Publicity
Rights to Cultural Icons, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 599, 604 (1998).
6. See Prager, supra note 3, at 122 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)).
7. See Prager, supra note 3, at 123. The Dilution Act defines “dilution” as the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of a famous
mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. 15
U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 1998); see also Cordero, supra note 5, at 617 n.101.
8. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West 1998).
9. See Prager, supra note 3, at 123.
10. See id. at 123.
11. See Appendix, infra p. 527 for illustrative diagram.
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wrongs are being committed—a wrong to plaintiff for infringement
of its mark, and a wrong to the public at large, which is being misled by the defendant’s activities. Dilution without infringement is
primarily premised upon plaintiff’s property right, since the public
is not being misled.12 In a pure dilution case, the absence of a public interest has caused some courts to view dilution claims unfavorably.13
The Dilution Act provides that the owner of a “distinctive and
famous” mark shall be entitled, under principles of equity, to an injunction against another’s commercial use of a mark or trade name,
if such use begins after the mark has become famous, and if it
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.14 To determine if a mark is “distinctive and famous” a court may consider
eight enumerated factors, but the statute states that the list is not
exclusionary of other factors. Those eight factors will be discussed
shortly.15 The Act states that the owner of the famous mark will
get only injunctive relief—unless the defendant “willfully” intended to trade on the owner’s reputation or to cause dilution.
Then, if willfulness is present, damages, lost profits, attorneys fees,
and increased damages are recoverable, subject to the discretion of
the court and principles of equity.16 If the defendant has a valid
federal registration on the principal register, that registration is a

12. See Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (“Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.”); Allied
Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 545 (distinguishing dilution as “[n]ot public confusion caused by similar products or services sold by
competitors, but a cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or services which feeds upon
the business reputation of an established distinctive trade-mark or name”).
13. See, e.g., Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 340
(1996) (concluding that there is no public interest in granting relief); I.P. Lund Trading v.
Kohler Co., 11 F. Supp.2d 112 (1998) (noting that preliminary injunction is appropriate
only with showing of public interest).
14. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West 1998).
15. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H); infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text. The original version of the anti-dilution bill stated that “[e]ach of the factors set forth in the provision should be weighed independently and it is the cumulative effect of these considerations which will determine whether a mark qualifies for federal protection from dilution.”
S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 42 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5604-05; see
also Cordero, supra note 5, at 618, n.103.
16. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2) (West 1998).
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complete bar to an action against that registration under a state
statute or state common law.17 So there is a degree of preemption
under the Federal statute. Certain actions are exempt: fair use for
comparative advertising or promotion of competing goods or services; noncommercial use of a famous trademark; and all forms of
news reporting and commentary.18 Finally, the statute defines the
term “dilution.” “Dilution” means the lessening of the capacity of
a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of competition between the
famous mark and others, or a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or
deception.19
This Essay revisits the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and
explores the issues surrounding its application. Part I discusses
how courts have dealt with the issue of whether the Act may be
applicable retroactively. Part II examines what makes a mark distinctive and famous under the Act. Part III reviews dilution under
the Act. This Essay concludes that there many uncertainties remain regarding the reach and long term impact of the Federal Dilution Act.
I. RETROACTIVITY
The Dilution Act became effective on January 16, 1996.
Clearly, activities completed before that date are not actionable
under the statute.20 Yet, for those marks that were adopted and
used before the effective date of the statute, and remain in use, a
question arises as to whether that use is properly enjoined. Thus
far, a majority of district courts have refused to do so.
Both the Dilution Act and its legislative history are silent as to
whether claims under the Act should be applied retroactively. In
the absence of clear Congressional intent favoring retroactivity, the
majority of the courts have followed the rule of the Supreme Court
17. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3) (West 1998).
18. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(4) (West 1998).
19. See supra note 7.
20. See, e.g., Bonechi S.R.L. v. Irving Weisdorf & Co., Ltd., 95 Civ. 4008, 1998
WL 193246, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1998) (stating that the Dilution Act does not apply
retroactively to permit recovery of damages for conduct that ceased prior to the effective
date of the statute).
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in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,21 which disfavors retroactivity
and requires examination of whether application of the statute
would attach new legal consequences to events completed before
enactment of the statute. New legal consequences would impair
rights possessed by a party when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.22
In the leading district court case to consider retroactive application of the Dilution Act, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Officemax,
Inc.,23 the court found that when a defendant, in the years before
the Dilution Act came into effect, was justified in selecting its
marks, investing in advertising, and expanding its business operations—considerations of fairness required the court to reject a federal dilution claim for either money damages or injunctive relief.24
To hold otherwise would cause the owner of the accused mark
“[to] lose its very identity, achieved as the result of conduct and
commercial investment, which was perfectly lawful at the time.”25
Guiding the court’s decision was the reasoning in Landgraf
that:
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and
to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations
should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the ‘principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be
assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took
place has timeless and universal appeal. . . . In a free and
dynamic society, creativity in both commercial and artistic
endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people
confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.26

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994).
See id. at 280.
949 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. Va. 1996).
See id. at 415.
See id.
Id. (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-66) (emphasis added).
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Other district courts have followed the holding in Circuit
City.27 At least one district court, however, has rejected the Circuit
City holding. In Fuente Cigar, Ltd. v. Opus One,28 the court allowed a party to amend its complaint to add a claim for injunctive
relief under the Dilution Act, even though the accused mark was
adopted and used before the statute came into effect. The court in
Fuente concluded that an injunction is a measure of prospective relief that does not attach new legal consequences to events completed before enactment of the Dilution Act.29
The only appellate court to consider this issue has rejected the
Circuit City holding. In Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enterprises, Inc.,30
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit relied, inter alia, on the
Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Landgraf that an intervening
statute “may ‘authorize[] . . . prospective relief’ without running
afoul of the traditional presumption against retroactivity.”31 As
noted in Viacom, the court in Circuit City dismissed this Supreme
Court pronouncement as mere dicta.32 Further, as the Viacom
court recognized, the Dilution Act expressly provides that its injunctive relief is “subject to the discretion of the court and the
principles of equity.”33

27. See, e.g., S Industries, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 991 F. Supp.
1012 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting that the absence of express retroactivity language in the
Federal Dilution Act precludes its application to conduct completed before its enactment); Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Nat’l Dev. Corp., 973 F. Supp. 552
(M.D.N.C. 1997) (concluding that there is no evidence in the text or legislative history of
the Dilution Act to support the Act’s application retroactively).
28. 985 F. Supp. 1448 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
29. See id. at 1453.
30. 141 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 1998).
31. Id. at 889 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 297 n.3) (alteration in original).
32. See Viacom, 141 F.3d at 889.
33. Id. at 890.
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II. WHAT MAKES A MARK DISTINCTIVE AND FAMOUS?
The Dilution Act sets forth eight factors which Courts may
consider to determine whether a mark is distinctive and famous.34
These factors include: the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;35 the duration and extent of use of the mark in
connection with the goods or services with which the mark is
used;36 the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the
mark;37 the geographical extent of the trading area in which the
mark is used;38 the channels of trade for the goods or services with
which the mark is used;39 the degree of recognition of the mark in
the trading areas and channels of trade of the mark’s owner and the
person against whom the injunction is sought;40 the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;41 and
whether the mark was registered under a prior trademark act or on
the principal register.42
Other factors, such as licensing revenue and the price of purchasing a trademark and its associated good will might be considered.43 However, hearsay, anecdotal, and conclusory statements
about alleged fame are given little, if any, weight when assessing
the fame of a mark.44

34. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (West 1998).
35. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(A) (West 1998).
36. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(B) (West 1998).
37. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(C) (West 1998).
38. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(D) (West 1998).
39. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(E) (West 1998).
40. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(F) (West 1998).
41. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(G) (West 1998).
42. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(H) (West 1998).
43. See In re Leslie Fay Cos., 216 B.R. 117, 127-128 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (indicating that the list of factors a court may consider in determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous is non-exclusive).
44. See King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 968 F. Supp. 568, 57778 (D. Colo. 1997).
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A. Fame in the Eyes of the General Public—Or Fame in
Plaintiffs’ and/or Defendants’ Channels of Trade?
Being a major player in a particular market weighs in favor of
finding a mark to be famous.45 On the other hand, a high degree of
recognition in a niche market is not enough to render a mark famous, and some courts at least have suggested that fame among the
general public is required.46 Yet, the general public may be the
wrong universe. Factor F of section 1125(c)(1) calls into question
the recognition of the allegedly famous mark in just two markets:
the market in which the allegedly famous mark travels and the
market in which the accused mark travels.47 Thus, while fame
among the public at large will always do, fame among a significant
class might be enough to be entitled to protection under the Act.
At least one commentator contends that, in view of Factor F, a
plaintiff’s mark should not be categorized as “famous” unless it is
known to more than fifty percent of the defendant’s potential customers.48

45. See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal.
1996), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
46. See Michael Caruso & Co., Inc. v. Estefan Enters., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1454,
1463 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (“Bongo” may be a distinctive mark in the junior women’s apparel
market, but it is not a generally famous mark); Knaack Mfg. Co. v. Rally Accessories,
Inc., 955 F. Supp. 991, 1003 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (no evidence that recognition of “Weather
Guard” spilled over into the general consumer market); King of the Mountain, 968 F.
Supp. at 578 (“King of the Mountain” is not famous outside of its niche market); Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1303 (“Panavision,” which had some advertisements and promotion
directed to the public, is famous); Golden Bear Int’l, Inc. v. Bear U.S.A., Inc., 969 F.
Supp. 742, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (although “Golden Bear” was found well known to golfers, it was not famous to the general public).
47. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1)(F) (West 1998).
48. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 24:92, at 24-156 to 157 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS].
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B. Acquiring Fame Takes Time and the “Buick”/”DuPont”
Analogy
Fame is seldom achieved overnight. Rather than attaining “instant fame,” a mark is much more likely to become famous over an
extended period of time.49 While one court has opined that 15
years “has been generally held an insufficient amount of time for a
mark to become famous,”50 generalities, of course may not apply
in any one particular case.51
Distinctiveness and fame are sometimes measured against
other marks. Citing to examples of dilution provided by Congress
(“Dupont shoes,” “Buick aspirin” and “Kodak pianos”), courts
sometimes consider whether the plaintiff’s mark “rises to the
level” of a “Buick” or “Kodak.”52 Trademarks such as “Bongo,”
“Weather Guard,” and “Golden Bear,” it has been held, do not
equal the fame of “Kodak,” and the like,53 and they have been de49. See, e.g., WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1631 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(“Wawa,” used for almost 90 years, is famous), aff’d, 116 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1997); Pirelli
Armstrong Tire Corp. v. Titan Tire Corp., 4 F. Supp.2d 794, 802 (C.D. Ill. 1998)
(“Pirelli” and “Armstrong,” registered trademarks for more than 80 years, are famous);
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1838 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Toys ‘R’
Us,” used for 36 years, is famous); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J.
1998) (“Jews for Jesus,” used for more than 24 years, is famous); In re Leslie Fay Cos.,
216 B.R. 117, 127 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (the “Albert Nipon” family of trademarks,
used for 15 years, were found to be famous); Teletech Customer Care Management (California), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Teletech,”
used for about 15 years is probably famous). Short-term marks have not been found famous. See Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 340, 350
(D.N.J. 1996) (“We’ll Take Good Care of You”, used for 9 years, was not famous); Appleseed Found., Inc. v. Appleseed Inst., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 672, 677 (D.D.C. 1997) (“Appleseed,” used for 3 years, is not famous).
50. Michael Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463 (finding that use of mark for only fifteen
years contradicts the contention that the mark is uniquely famous).
51. See Michael Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463. See, e.g., Teletech, 977 F. Supp. at
1413; Leslie Fay, 216 B.R. at 127.
52. Michael Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463 (“Bongo” clothing did not rise to the
level of “Buick” or “Dupont”); Golden Bear Int’l, Inc. v. Bear U.S.A., Inc., 969 F. Supp.
742, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (“Golden Bear” does not rise to the level of “Exxon,” “Kodak”
or “Coca-Cola”); Knaack Mfg. Co. v. Rally Accessories, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 991, 1003
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (“Weather Guard . . . lacks the widespread fame and celebrity as marks
such as Coca-Cola, Polaroid, Disney, Kodak or Rolls Royce.”).
53. See Michael Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463; Golden Bear, 969 F. Supp. at 749;
Knaack, 955 F. Supp. at 1003;.
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nied protection under the Act. At the same time, some courts have
already held marks to be famous and protectable from dilution
even though they unquestionably do not have the notoriety of
“DuPont”, “Buick” or “Kodak.”54
C. Third Party Usage and the Geographic Extent of the
Mark’s Trading Area
It is important to remember that a mark must not only be “famous,” it must also be “distinctive” to be protected under the Dilution Act.55 Extensive third party use of the same or similar marks
is a strong indication that a mark is not distinctive. Third party use
of the same or similar mark diminishes its distinctiveness, regardless of whether the third party use is found within the same market56 and regardless of whether it causes confusion.57
Although the Dilution Act does not require nationwide fame,
“fame in only one state militates strongly against meriting protection from dilution under federal law.”58 The legislative history of
the act supports this conclusion: “[t]he geographic fame of the
mark must extend throughout a substantial portion of the U.S..”59
Yet, in WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, the “WAWA” name for convenience
stores was found famous even though those stores operated in only

54. See Augusta Nat’l, Inc. v. Sir Christopher Hatton, Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1846
(N.D. Ga. 1996) (granting preliminary injunction based on likelihood that “Augusta” golf
towels infringes and dilutes “Augusta” golf-related goods); Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v.
Salon Sciences Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995, 1998 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (granting preliminary
injunction based on likelihood that “Pro-Techniques,” “Double P Design,” “Formula 2,”
and “Formula 2 Ultra” fingernail care products and trade dress infringe and dilute
“Nailtiques,” “Double N Design” and “Formula 2 Plus” fingernail care products and
trade dress); Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 688, 696 (D. Md.
1996) (finding that “The Frederick Gazette” newspaper infringes and dilutes plaintiff’s
18 Maryland newspapers which include “Gazette” in their name).
55. Note, however, that some commentators contend that as used in the Dilution
Act, “distinctiveness” is synonymous with fame or, at the very least, distinctiveness is
redundant. See 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 48, § 24:91, at 24-147 to 148.
56. See Sports Authority, Inc. v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 925, 941
(E.D. Mich. 1997); Star Mkts., Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1030, 1035 (D. Haw.
1996) (considering same or similar marks by third parties in any industry).
57. See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 517 (M.D. Pa. 1998).
58. Star Markets, 950 F. Supp. at 1035.
59. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1034.
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five states.60
Geographic considerations, of course, highlight the importance
of pursuing state dilution claims, where appropriate. Indeed, Congress recognized that “[s]tate laws could continue to be applied in
cases involving locally famous or distinctive marks.”61
D. Surveys Designed to Show that a Mark is Distinctive and
Famous
Owners of famous marks have used surveys in their attempts to
prove that their marks are famous and protectable pursuant to the
Dilution Act. The surveys used in three recent cases illustrate different approaches taken in an attempt to show the distinctiveness
and fame of a word mark, slogan and trade dress.
1. The Star Markets Survey
In Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc.,62 plaintiff had a secondary meaning survey conducted to measure the association between the word “Star” and plaintiff’s grocery stores. 63 The survey
showed that more than seventy-five percent of the survey respondents in Hawaii associated the word “Star” with plaintiff’s “Star
Market” supermarket.64 Both parties and the Court agreed that the
survey proved that “Star” had acquired distinctiveness (also known
as secondary meaning), but the court did not agree with plaintiff’s
contention that the high degree of association necessarily equates
to a high level of distinctiveness.65 Instead, the court faulted the
survey for not measuring the relative strength of consumers’ association between the plaintiff’s use of the word “Star” and third
party uses of the same or similar mark.66 Thus, the court found
that although the mark was distinctive, it had less than a high level

60. See WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1632 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
61. Star Markets, 950 F. Supp. at 1034 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030-31).
62. 950 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Haw. 1996).
63. See id. at 1033.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.

VASSALLO.NEW.TYP.DOC

514

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

9/29/2006 4:36 PM

[Vol. 9:503

of distinctiveness.67
In that same case, plaintiff also had a “recognition” survey
conducted, in which respondents were asked the names of any grocery stores or supermarkets they could recall.68 Over ninety six
percent of respondents recalled plaintiff’s mark, “Star Markets.”69
The results of the survey also showed that “Star Markets” received
more recognition than “DuPont,” and only slightly less recognition
than “Kodak” or “Buick.”70 While the survey may have established the fame of plaintiff’s mark in Hawaii, even plaintiff did not
contend that a national survey would yield the same results.71
2. The Ringling Bros. Survey
A “recognition” survey in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development72
asked respondents to fill in the blank in the following statements:
“The Greatest _____ On Earth” and “Don’t Leave _____ Without
It.”73 Once the statements were completed, respondents were
asked with whom or what they associated the completed statement.
About forty percent of respondents formed the statement “The
Greatest Show On Earth” and associated it with the Circus.74 In
the control, about the same percentage of respondents formed the
statement “Don’t Leave Home Without It” and associated that
statement with American Express.75 Since the American Express
slogan was assumed to be famous, the equal recognition of the two
slogans was evidence that “The Greatest Show On Earth” is a famous mark.76

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id. at 1034.
See id. at 1035.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1035.
955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997).
See id. at 612.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 612, 613 n.4.
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3. The Hershey Survey
In Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc.,77 a claim for dilution of
trade dress was at issue. Plaintiff sought to protect only certain
elements of the packaging of its “Reese’s” peanut butter candy—
namely its combination of orange, brown and yellow—from alleged dilution by the packaging of peanut butter “M&M’s.”78 Hershey’s expert conducted a secondary meaning and fame survey by
relabeling the “Reese’s” package as “Brand X” and altering other
aspects of the trade dress, and then asking respondents to identify
the brand and their reason for doing so.79 Some ninety four percent of respondents identified the mock-up as “Reese’s” and only
“Reese’s.”80 Nevertheless, the court considered the color combination at issue as similar to enough third-party marks in the food industry that it did not seem worthy of protection as famous, and the
court declined to enter a preliminary injunction.81
III. DILUTION
The Dilution Act defines dilution as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2)
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”82
How dilution occurs, or by what means it may be measured or
detected is not specified in the Act. Congress intended the above
definition “to encompass all forms of dilution recognized by the
courts, including dilution by blurring, by tarnishment and disparagement, and by diminishment.”83 Blurring and diminishment injure the mark’s selling power by “whittling away” the distinctive77. 998 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Pa. 1998).
78. See id. at 502.
79. See id. at 509-10.
80. See id. at 511.
81. See id. at 517.
82. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1998).
83. Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029); see also Ringling
Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp.
204, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1838
(N.D. Cal. 1996).
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ness of a mark and the ability of the mark to serve as a unique
identifier of the source of goods and services.84 Tarnishment and
disparagement damage the image of the trademark.85 For example,
they involve the unauthorized use of a trademark with goods of
poor quality or the unauthorized association of a trademark with a
disparaging, negative or unwholesome message.
Dilution can also result from conduct that does not neatly fit
into the categories of tarnishment and blurring. For example, in
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,86 the defendant registered famous trademarks of others as Internet domain names for
the purpose of selling the domain name registrations to the trademark owners. Although the court did not find either tarnishment or
blurring, it found that the defendant “diminished ‘the capacity of
the Panavision marks to identify and distinguish Panavision’s
goods and services on the Internet’ [as a domain name].”87
A. Dilution by Tarnishment or Disparagement and Dilution by
Blurring
Cases that involve dilution by tarnishment or disparagement
generally are easier for the courts to decide than are those involving dilution by blurring. As Justice Stewart has stated in connection with obscenity and pornography, obscenity may be hard to define but “he knows it when he sees it.”88 Similarly, courts have
had little difficulty, for example, in finding that “Adults R Us” in
an Internet site tarnished and thereby diluted “Toys ‘R’ Us” and
84. See 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 48, § 24:68.
85. See id. § 24:95.
86. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998), aff’g, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
87. Id. at 1326 (quoting Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D.
Cal. 1996)). CHECK CASE NAME
88. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart opined:
I have reached the conclusion, which I think is confirmed at least by negative
implication in the Court’s decisions since Roth and Alberts, that under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define the
kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it
when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.
Id. (citations omitted).
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“Kids ‘R’ Us” when used to sell sexual products.89
To determine whether conduct constitutes dilution by blurring,
a number of courts follow the six factor test set forth by Judge
Sweet in Mead Data, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales.90 The factors
considered are the similarity of the marks, the similarity of the
products covered by the marks, the sophistication of consumers,
the predatory intent, the renown of the senior mark, and the renown of the junior mark.91
Protection under the Dilution Act is not limited to offending
marks that are identical to the famous mark; marks that are similar
or imitative may dilute the value of a famous mark.92
A number of courts have considered five of the above factors,
without considering predatory intent.93 Indeed, predatory intent is
not required under section 43(c). The Dilution Act contemplates
the issuance of an injunction where dilution is found and an award
of damages in only those cases where the defendant “willfully intended to trade on the owner’s reputation or to cause dilution.”94
89. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1836-39 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (granting preliminary injunction). See also Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman,
46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (permanent injunction granted prohibiting
the tarnishing use of “The Polo Club” and “Polo Executive Retreat” for an adult entertainment establishment).
90. 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, concurring). See, e.g., Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp.
605, 618 (E.D. Va. 1997) (applying the six factor test); WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1632 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (same); American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947
F. Supp. 310, 316-17 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (same).
91. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1035; Sara Lee Corp. v. American Leather Prods.,
Inc., No. 97-C-4158, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11914, at *31 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 1998); Ringling Bros., 955 F. Supp. at 618; WAWA, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1632; American Express Co.
v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 316-17 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
92. See, e.g., Ringling Bros., 955 F. Supp. at 618 (“For blurring to occur, a junior
mark must be substantially similar to a senior mark.”); WAWA, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1632
(finding that “HAHA 24 HR. Market” and “Wawa” are similar in sight, sound, and context).
93. See, e.g., Lexington Management Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F.
Supp.2d 271, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Johnson Publ’g Co. v. Willitts Designs Int’l, Inc.,
No. 98-C-2653, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9264, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 1998); In re Leslie Fay Cos., 216 B.R. 117, 133 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); Clinique Labs., Inc. v. Dep
Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 562 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
94. Ringling Bros., 937 F. Supp. at 215 n.3 (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)).
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Likewise, some courts have stated that similarity of the products should not be considered in an analysis of a federal dilution
claim,95 in that Congress recognized that dilution may exist
“whether or not the parties market the same or related goods . . .”96
Nevertheless, some courts hold that when the products covered by
the marks are dissimilar, a stronger showing of blurring is required
than if the products were similar.97
Renown of the junior user has also been ignored as a factor, or
considered of marginal relevance, by some courts when the junior
user is new to the market.98 However, other courts have held that
where the fame of the junior user’s mark is low or non-existent, it
is unlikely that the such mark will cause even minimal, if any, dilution by blurring.99
Commentators have also weighed in with opinions on which of
the six Mead factors should be used in a court’s analysis of a federal dilution claim. No doubt, more debate on this issue will follow. 100
B. Surveys Designed to Show Dilution and “Likelihood” of
Dilution
In Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc.,101 the plaintiff sought to
protect elements of the trade dress of its “Reese’s” peanut butter
candy from alleged dilution by the packaging of peanut butter
“M&M’s” and relied on a survey to show a likelihood of dilution.
For the “Hershey,” “M&M’s” and control packages used in the

95. See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 519-20 (M.D. Pa.
1998).
96. Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029).
97. See Ringling Bros., 937 F. Supp. at 212; American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc.,
947 F. Supp. 310, 317 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores,
Inc., 939 F. Supp. 340, 350 (D.N.J. 1996).
98. See Clinique Labs., 945 F. Supp. at 563; Leslie Fay, 216 B.R. at 133 n.9; Lexington Management, 10 F. Supp.2d at 289.
99. See Ringling Bros., 937 F. Supp. at 214; American Express, 947 F. Supp. at 318.
100. See, e.g., Hershey, 998 F. Supp. at 504 (citing 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS,
supra note 48, § 24:94.1, at 24-163 to 164) (factors 2, 3, 4 and 6 are not relevant); Prager,
supra note 3, at 135 n.51 (stating that factors 2, 3, 5 and 6 are not relevant)).
101. 998 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Pa. 1998).
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survey, Hershey relabeled the packages as “Brand X” and also altered the packages to selectively retain more design elements for
some brands and less design elements for others.102 In denying
Hershey’s request for a preliminary injunction, the court found that
the unfairly altered “M&M’s” and control packages provided no
evidence of any alleged dilution caused by the “M&M’s” trade
dress.103
In Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Division of Travel Development,104 the plaintiff in a dilution
survey showed that twenty five percent of Utah respondents, compared to forty one percent of respondents nationwide, associated
the statement “The Greatest _____ on Earth” with Ringling Bros.
alone.105 In Utah, respondents also heavily associated the incomplete statement with the defendant, Utah Division of Travel’s
(“Utah Travel’s”) slogan “The Greatest Snow on Earth.”106 Outside Utah, the Utah Travel slogan is essentially unknown. The
court rejected this survey as evidence of dilution because (1) outside of Utah the survey provides no evidence of dilution, (2) within
Utah there was no evidence that persons associate the slogan “The
Greatest Show On Earth” with Utah Travel, snow or skiing, (3)
there was no evidence that fewer respondents in Utah associate the
Ringling Bros. mark with a circus, and (4) the survey provided no
evidence that the Ringling Bros. slogan no longer “call[s] immediately to mind” the circus in Utah.107 Clearly, the main defect of the
survey was that it tested the fill-in-the-blank statement “The Greatest _____ On Earth,” rather than the famous Ringling Bros.
mark.108 The high percentage of respondents that associated the
completed statement, “The Greatest Show on Earth,” with only
Ringling Bros. also showed the absence of dilution.109

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
1982)).
108.
109.

See id. at 509-10, 518-19.
See id. at 511.
955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997)
See id. at 618.
See id.
Id. at 617 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Exxene Corp., 696 F.2d 544, 550 (7th Cir.
See id. at 618.
See id. at 616-618.
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In WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf,110 twenty nine percent of survey respondents located in the neighborhood of defendant’s market associated the “HAHA 24 Hr. Market” with plaintiff’s “Wawa” market.111 The court found that this survey was credible and supports
its own conclusion that “HAHA 24 HR. MARKET” dilutes the
value of plaintiff’s mark.112
Clearly, the issuance of a preliminary injunction in a dilution
case requires a determination of the likelihood of dilution, that is,
the likelihood of prevailing on the dilution claim at trial. When
considering the issuance of a permanent injunction, some courts
mistakenly based their decision on the “likelihood” of dilution,113
perhaps because of the “likelihood of confusion” language for infringement in the Lanham Act.114 Where the means for measuring
and detecting dilution are not always apparent, these mistaken references make a proper determination of dilution all the more difficult.
C. Media, Parody, and Noncommercial Use Exceptions and
Protection on the Internet
The Dilution Act specifically exempts certain uses of a mark as
not actionable under the statute.115 These exempt uses include the
“[f]air use of a famous mark by another person in comparative
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing
goods or services of the owner of the famous mark . . . [the]
[n]oncommercial use of a mark . . . [and] [a]ll forms of news reporting and news commentary.”116
Non-commercial use of a mark includes constitutionally protected speech. Congress intended that parody, satire, editorial and
110. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
111. See id. at 1632.
112. See id.
113. See Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1048 (S.D. Tex.
1998) (basing permanent injunction on “likelihood” of dilution); In re Leslie Fay Cos.,
216 B.R. 117, 133 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (basing permanent injunction on “likelihood”
of dilution); Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1240 (granting summary judgment on the finding
of “likelihood” of dilution).
114. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (West 1998).
115. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(4) (West 1998).
116. Id.
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other forms of expression that are not part of a commercial transaction” should be exempt from the reach of the Dilution Act.117
The Dilution Act has become a useful tool for resolving Internet trademark disputes, as was intended by Congress. Frequently
cited by the courts is Senator Leahy’s statement that he “hope[d]
that this anti-dilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive
Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are
associated with the products and reputations of others.”118
Dilution has been found where a defendant has used an organization’s mark as a domain name to make disparaging statements
about the organization and/or as a platform to advance views contrary to the teachings and practices of the organization. These sites
are intended to intercept, through the use of deceit and trickery, the
audience sought by the legitimate organization. Such conduct
amounts to dilution by tarnishment or blurring.119
Even the danger of potential tarnishment has been cited as a
basis for finding dilution. In Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen,120 the defendant used plaintiff’s mark in his Internet site domain name,
even though the site contained nothing more than a map and con117. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559,
1574 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch)), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). The Cat Not in the Hat! A
Parody by Dr. Juice, a book about the O.J. Simpson murder trial which mimics the distinctive style of the Dr. Seuss works, was held to be an expressive use exempt from the
reach of the Dilution Act. See id.; see also Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records Inc., 46
U.S.P.Q.2d 1407, 1419-20 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (denying motion for preliminary injunction
absent stronger evidence that “Barbie Girl” song and video parody actually tarnishes the
image of Mattel’s “Barbie” doll).
118. See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998)
(quoting 141 CONG. REC. S19312-01 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Leahy)); see also, Teletech Customer Care Management (California), Inc. v. Tele-Tech
Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp.
1227, 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
119. See, e.g., Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998) (issuing a
preliminarily injunction against the defendant from using the name of the plaintiff organization, Jews for Jesus, as a domain name). Other examples of tarnishment on the
Internet include the use of the name “Adults R Us” in an Internet site in association with
sexual products that are inconsistent with the “Toys ‘R’ Us” image, see Toys “R” Us, Inc.
v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1838 (N.D. Cal. 1996), and the use of the domain name
“candyland.com” in association with sexually explicit material, see Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
120. 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
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tained no information about the plaintiff’s products.121 As explained by the court, “if [defendant] were allowed to use ‘intermatic.com,’ Intermatic’s name and reputation would be at [defendant’s] mercy and could be associated with an unimaginable
amount of messages on [defendant’s] web page . . . . Attaching Intermatic’s name to a myriad of possible messages . . . is something
that the [Lanham] Act does not permit.”122
Dilution has occurred on the Internet, not only through the use
of a famous trademark as a domain name, but also through metatags. Metatags are the machine readable codes found in Internet
web pages that can be used by individuals or search engines to access a trademark owner’s web site by searching for the trademark.
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label,123 the unauthorized use of the trademarks “Playboy” and “Playmate,” as part
of a domain name and metatag, was preliminarily enjoined. However, when a defendant makes fair use of a famous mark, either in
a website or in metatags, there is no dilution.124
D. The “Commercial Use in Commerce” Requirement
The Dilution Act protects owners of famous marks from “another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade
name, if such use . . . causes dilution . . .”125 Both “commercial
use” and “in commerce,” two distinct requirements, must be established to succeed on a federal dilution claim.
The “in commerce” requirement is a jurisdictional predicate to
many federal laws. For example, the Lanham Act claims for infringement, false designation of origin, and false descriptions also
have an “in commerce” requirement.126 Although the Lanham
Act’s definition of “in commerce” may appear, at first glance, to

121. See id. at 1232.
122. Id. at 1239-40.
123. 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
124. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1186, 1192 (S.D. Cal.
1998) (denying preliminary injunction where the defendant used the trademarks “Playmate” and “Playmate of the Year” in her website and metatags to identify herself because
it constituted fair use).
125. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 1998) (emphasis added).
126. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (West 1998).
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be a narrow one,127 the scope of “in commerce” has been given a
broad and sweeping interpretation by the courts.
For example, in Planned Parenthood Federation v. Bucci,128
the court found that defendant’s use of plaintiff’s service mark in
his Internet domain name “plannedparenthood.com” and web site
satisfied the “use in commerce” requirement for two reasons.129
First, the defendant used the Internet and his actions had an effect
on the plaintiff’s interstate commerce activities. Second, Internet
users must use interstate telephone lines to access defendant’s web
site.130
In the same case, the “commercial use” requirement, however,
was met for three reasons: (1) defendant promoted a third party’s
book on his web site; (2) defendant was a non-profit political activist who solicited funds for his activities (although he did not directly solicit funds on his web site); and (3) defendant’s actions
were designed to, and did, harm the plaintiff commercially.131 The
127. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1998). The statute provides that:
The term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes
of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce(1) on goods when(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the
nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B)the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services
and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered more
than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.
Id.
128. 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1434 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
129. See id. at 1434.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1435. See also Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J.
1998) (dicta that “commercial use” was present for three reasons: (1) where there are indirect sales on the Internet, via the use of a hyperlink to a separate organization which
sells merchandise; (2) by “disparaging the plaintiff organization and preventing [it] from
exploiting [its own m]ark”; and (3) by inhibiting the efforts of Internet users to locate the
trademark/service mark owner’s Internet site); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141
F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998) (trading on the value of plaintiff’s trademark by registering it as a domain name and attempting to sell the domain name to the plaintiff constitutes commercial use.); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill.
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court’s recognition of the effect of the defendant’s actions on the
plaintiff’s commercial use and use in commerce illustrates the expansive interpretation of the “commercial use”/”in commerce” requirements.132
The cases against Network Solutions Inc. (“NSI”) in Academy
of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Network Solutions Inc.,133
also highlight the importance of the “commercial use” and “in
commerce” requirements.134 NSI is a private company which performs the function of registering Internet domain names.135 The
district court denied a motion for preliminary injunction against
NSI where there was no likelihood that the Academy of Motion
Picture Arts and Sciences, holder of the registered trademarks
“Academy Awards” and “Oscars,” would succeed in demonstrating that domain names themselves are goods or services, the sale
of which may cause dilution.136 The court held that the mere registration of a domain name does not constitute “commercial use” or
use “in commerce.”137 That is because the registration of a domain
name, without more, does not constitute use of the name as a
trademark.138 NSI’s limited action, mere registration, did not involve the sale or offer for sale of goods or services.139
E. Other Considerations When Pursuing, or Defending
Against, a Federal Dilution Claim
Section 1125(c)(1) of title 15 provides that “the owner of a famous mark” shall be entitled to an injunction where another person’s use of a mark causes dilution.140 An exclusive licensee of a
1996) (finding of “commercial use” based on intention to arbitrage the registered domain
name; “in commerce” requirement met by use of the Internet which transmits communications worldwide).
132. See Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239-40.
133. 989 F. Supp. 1276 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
134. See id. at 1279.
135. See id. at 1277.
136. See id. at 1281.
137. See id. at 1278-79.
138. See id. at 1280.
139. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 957960 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (basing summary judgment on dilution claim in favor of NSI on the
conclusion that NSI does not make “commercial use” of domain names as trademarks).
140. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West 1998).
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mark is not an “owner” and does not have standing to seek injunctive relief for its federal dilution claim.141Contributory dilution is a
new theory of liability, and no cases were found in which a party
succeeded with this claim. In the few cases mentioning contributory dilution, there has been no meaningful discussion of such
claim.142 Due to the essentially equitable nature of the provisions
of the Dilution Act, at least one court has held the parties in that
case were not entitled to a jury trial.143
One goal of the Dilution Act was to prevent the forum shopping that resulted from the limited number of states with antidilution statutes.144 Certainly, in those states where there was no
state dilution law the federal statute has filled in the gaps by making a federal dilution claim available. The federal dilution statute,
however, does not preempt state dilution law with one minor exception.145 Thus, to the extent state dilution law is more favorable
than the federal law, forum shopping may still appeal to the owner
of a famous mark. A frivolous claim under the Dilution Act may
result in an award of attorneys fees to the defendant. Attorneys

141. See STX, Inc. v. Bauer USA, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492, 1495-96 (N.D. Cal.
1997).
142. See Academy, 989 F. Supp. at 1279 (the plaintiff’s failure to cite any case law
or statutory basis for its claim of contributory dilution weighed strongly against the issuance of a preliminary injunction on this claim); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 640, 645-646 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying plaintiff’s motion to
amend the complaint to add a claim for contributory dilution in view of the tenuous nature of the claim and the plaintiff’s undue delay); Kegan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 42
U.S.P.Q.2d 1053, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on the claim of contributory dilution because of the existence of genuine issues
of material fact).
143. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 598, 600 (E.D. Va. 1997).
144. See Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing 141 CONG. REC. H14317-01,
H14317 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead)); American Express Co.
v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 314 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
145. See Kegan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1053, 1061 (N.D. Ill.
1996); Ringling Bros., 937 F. Supp. at 208 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031 (“the Act was not intended to ‘pre-empt existing state dilution statutes . . . [A] federal dilution statute should . . . co-exist with state
dilution law.’”)); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
However, the Act does bar a state dilution claim against a federally registered mark. See
supra Part I.
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fees were awarded in a case where the plaintiff failed to allege that
the mark was famous and supplied no evidence to show that the
mark was famous.146
CONCLUSION
There remain many uncertainties about the reach and long term
impact of the Federal Dilution Act. It will be interesting to see
whether the appellate courts will apply the statute to marks not as
notorious as “Buick” or “Kodak”; whether they too, like the Hershey court, will reject attempts by plaintiffs to argue that portions
of a defendants’ trade dress dilutes their own trade dress; and to
what extent the Mead factors are deemed relevant to a determination of dilution by blurring.

146. See S Industries, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 991 F. Supp. 1012,
1024 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
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APPENDIX
PRINCIPLES OF TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND TRADEMARK
DILUTION: AN ILLUSTRATION.
Principles of Trademark Infringement, Trademark Dilution,
and their convergence may be illustrated as follows:

A

C

B

A—Dilution: “Famous and Distinctive” marks diluted but not
infringed because of the absence of likelihood of confusion.
B—Infringement: Marks infringed because of likelihood of
confusion, but marks are not diluted because they are not “Famous
and Distinctive.”
C—Infringement and Dilution: Dilution of “Famous and Distinctive” marks and infringement because of likelihood of confusion.

